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Statutory Priority in Right to Administer Estates
By PIoCE LivELY*
In the majority of cases where a decedent dies intestate, those
who are entitled to participate in the estate are able to agree
among themselves as to who will administer the estate. In such
cases statutes granting preferences to certain persons are of little
or no concern. However, there are cases where, for any number
of reasons, the interested parties are not able to agree. When
this situation arises the preference statutes acquire a practical
importance,
Most states have some sort of preference statute and in
nearly all cases the first preference in the right to administer an
estate is given to the surviving husband or wife. Upon failure of
the surviving spouse to qualify, the preference is given to the next
of kin, then to creditors, and, in most states, finally to such other
person as the probate judge may appoint. Typical of this is the
Kentucky statute, which reads, in part as follows:1
(1) The court shall grant administration to the relations of the deceased who apply for administration, preferring the surviving husband or wife, and then such others
as are next entitled to distribution, or one or more of them
whom the court judges will best manage the estate.
(2) If no person mentioned in subsection (1) applies for administration at the second county court from the
death of an intestate, the court may grant administration to
a creditor, or to any other person, in its discretion.
Examples of statutes which are similar to KRS 395.040, though
varying in some details, are those of Alabama,2 North Carolina, 3
Tennessee,4 and Illinois."
In a number of cases the courts have been called upon to
determine whether or not these preferences are absolutely man-
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'ILL. RBv. STATS., Ch. 3, sec. 248.
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datory. The typical case arises where there is hostility, real or
fancied, between the surviving husband or wife and the heirs
and next of kin who share in the estate. The courts of Alabama
have consistently held that unless a preferred applicant is unfit
by reason of specific disqualifying factors set out in another
statute, he must be appointed.6 A similar interpretation of the
North Carolina statute was made in the case of In re Edwards'
Estate,7 where it was held that the right to be preferred in appointment is an absolute one unless the applicant is disqualified.
On the other hand, in a number of states statutory preferences
have been held not to be mandatory, and probate courts have
been upheld in exercising a discretion to appoint a stranger while
passing over a member of a class preferred by statute. Examples
of such holdings are found in the Washington case of Estate of
W. R. Thomas8 and the case from North Dakota of Ellis v. Ellis,9
where there were serious disputes and strong feeling between the
various surviving members of the family.
The interpretation of Kentucky's preference statute has been
strongly inclined to the view that the preference is mandatory, if
statutory requirements are met. In the case of Buckner's Admr.
v. Buckner'0 the Kentucky statute was held to be mandatory and
to negative any power in the county judge to appoint a stranger
in cases where a member of a preferred class is competent to administer and makes application within the statutory time. In
that case it was held to be error for the county court to appoint
the mother of the intestate and her nominee, when a daughter
whose legitimacy was questioned had made timely application.
Kentucky has refused to follow the rule applied in some states
where the probate court appoints the person chosen by a majority
of the heirs. The Court of Appeals has held that to do so would
be contrary to the explicit provisions of the preference statute,
which is mandatory in its terms." The case of Anderson's Committee v. Anderson's Adnrj 2 provides an interesting interpreta'E. G. Loeb v. Callaway, 250 Ala. 524, 35 S. 2d 198 (1948); Griffin v.
Irwin, 246 Ala. 631, 21 S. 2d 668 (1945); Calvert v. Beck, 240 Ala. 442, 199
So. 846 (1940).
"234 N.C. 202, 66 S.E. 2d 675 (1951).
a167 Wash. 115, 8 P. 2d 963, 80 A.L.R. 824 (1932).
42 N.D. 535, 174 N.W. 76 (1919).
10120 Ky. 596, 87 S.W. 776 (1905).
n Moran v. Moran's Admr., 172 Ky. 343, 189 S.W. 248 (1916).
1161 Ky. 18, 170 S.W. 213 (1914).
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tion of the preference statute. There the decedent was survived
by an only son, who had been adjudged a person of unsound
mind and for whom a committee had been appointed, and a halfbrother. The court held that the son's committee was entitled to
appointment as administrator as against the brother. Such cases
as this point up the underlying logic of the preference statutes.
The key to these statutes is not the closeness of kin so much as it
is the actual financial interest in the estate. Only because this is
true, would a stranger who is the committee of a member of a
prefered class be appointed instead of the brother himself of the
decedent. The statute is designed to assure that the person who
has the most at stake financially will be given the first opportunity
to settle the estate. This is the conclusion reached in the case of
Ellwanger v. Ellwanger's Adnmr,"3 where it was held that a resident of Kentucky who was a relative, but not entitled to share in
the estate, had no control over the appointment of the administrator, even though all of the relatives who did share were disqualified by reason of non-residence.
While KRS 395.040 is mandatory, the preferences are not
absolute, since the applicant must be qualified for appointment.
As the court said in Hood v. Higgins' Curator,14 the right of precedence established by the statute is a valuable one of which a
party cannot be deprived without legal cause, but it recognized
the existence of disqualifying causes. What then are the legal
causes which can deprive a person, given a preference by statute,
of his prior right to be appointed administrator? The Hood case
lists nonresidence, nonage and "other sufficient cause." Some of
these other causes are set out in the statute relating to the removal of representatives." 5 This statute lists, as grounds for removal of a personal representative, in addition to nonresidence,
that the representative "becomes insane or otherwise incapable to
discharge the trust, goes bankrupt or insolvent or is in failing circumstances" or that he fails to give additional security when required. It would be fruitless to appoint a person who was possessed at the time of appointment of one or more of these statu"278 Ky. 584, 129 S.W. 2d 127 (1939).
225 Ky. 718, 9 S.W. 2d 1078 (1928).
"Ky. Rlv. STAT. sec. 395.160 (1953).
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tory grounds for removal, and the Court of Appeals has so held.'0
No other grounds for refusing to appoint one preferred by KRS
395.040 seem to have been recognized, but the term "otherwise
incapable to discharge the trust" has been construed a number of
times. In Barnett'sAdm'r v. Pittman, 7 for example, it was held
that the fact that the mother of the decedent had given birth to
an illegitimate child more than thirty years earlier was not sufficient cause for denying her appointment, the evidence showing
that she had been of good moral character since that time. The
question of whether bad moral character is ever, of itself, suflicient
reason for denying the right to appointment was not decided.
While a mere personal hostility between an applicant for appointment as administrator and one or more of the distributees
might not necessarily disqualify the applicant for appointment,
it has been held that such an antagonistic position toward a
distributee as might lead to an awkward or unsatisfactory situation would be grounds for removal of an administrator, and
therefore grounds for denying the appointment in the first place.""
On first examination, there is apparently some disagreement between the holdings in Barnett's Admr'r v. Pittman 9 on the one
hand and Hunt v. Crocker0 and the more recent cases of Mullins
v. Mullins2' and Howd v. Clay22 on the other hand. The point of
distinction seems to be that in the Barnett case, where it was held
that hostility alone does not disqualify, the hostility toward other
distributees was not accompanied by any adverse claim against
the estate itself on the part of the applicant for appointment.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that if the courts should systematically give to the phrase "otherwise incapable to discharge the
trust" a broad and elastic enough construction the preference
statutes could come to have little meaning. At least, it seems fair
to state that the mandatory nature of the preference statute is
much less certain when it is considered in the light of the more
liberal interpretations of the disqualifying statute. In view of
Barnett's Adrn'r v. Pittman, 282 Ky. 162, 137 S.W. 2d 1098 (1940); Hunt
246 Ky. 338, 55 S.W. 2d 20 (1932).
v. Crocker,
7
'8 Supra note 16.
291 Ky. 211, 163 S.W. 2d 463 (1942).
" Price's Adm'r v. Price et al.,
Supra note 16.

Supra note 16.
307 Ky. 748, 212 S.W. 2d 272 (1948).
2312

Ky. 508, 228 S.W. 2d 437, 18 A.L.R. 2d 629 (1950).
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the result reached in such cases as Howd v. Clay,23 it is obvious
that the words "if qualified" are of critical importance. A close
study of all the decisions cited herein reveals that there is no real
conflict, though at times, based on particularly strong facts, language may have been used which went farther than necessary
for general application. The following quotation from Liberty
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kentucky Title Trust Co.24 seems to state
very well the limits to which the mandate of the preference statute
in Kentucky is subject:
It is error to deny the right of precedence to a person entitled thereto. While the right to be preferred as a
personal representative is a substantial one and must be
respected, it is to be applied only to the extent and under
the circumstances indicated by the statute. The jurisdiction
of the court is not delimited, but its discretion is directed,
in those instances where a preference is prescribed.
In addition to exercising discretion in determining the qualifications of those who are preferred by statute, the courts must
at times determine who among several applicants is actually
within the preferred class. Thus, in case of dispute, the county
court must first determine the degree of relationship of those applying for appointment and grant it to the one next entitled to
distribution, and an error in the determination of the degree of
relationship is not void, but merely erroneous. 25 The case of
6 presented the problem,
Hood v. Higgins' Curator2
not of the
degree of relationship as between blood relatives, but the legality
of the status of an adopted daughter. The decedent died intestate
and within the statutory time his adopted daughter applied to
the county court for appointment as administrator. There was
no widow or natural child surviving. Certain of the relatives and
creditors of the decedent objected to the appointment of the
adopted daughter on the ground that a suit was pending in the
circuit court to set aside the judgment of adoption, and until this
suit had been determined the adopted daughter should not be
permitted to exercise rights which had been conferred on her
solely by reason of the judgment of adoption. The county court
Ibid.
24239 Ky. 263, 266, 39 S.W. 2d 258, 261 (1931).

'Buckner's Adm'rs v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 120 Ky. 600, 87 S.W. 777
(1905).
225 Ky. 718, 9 S.W. 2d 1078 (1928).
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refused to appoint the daughter administrator and appointed a
curator instead. The circuit court affirmed, but on appeal the
Court of Appeals reversed. It was held that the judgment of
adoption was in full force and effect, and, until vacated, it was
entitled to full faith and credit and was binding on the county
court. The court observed that the preference statute would have
little meaning if the rights of one entitled to be a personal representative could be indefinitely postponed and suspended by an
action in which his status was attacked. It was also pointed out
that the daughter was bonded and the estate was not going to
suffer if she was permitted to qualify and begin the administration instead of suspending all activities until her legal status had
been settled. The problem of this case possibly arises most frequently when relatives of the decedent resent a late-in-life marriage and seek to deprive the widow of the right to administer by
attacking the validity of the marriage itself. In such a case it
would appear to be the duty of the county court to appoint the
widow and permit her to proceed with the orderly administration of the estate, under bond, while the necessarily long process
of settling her status is determined by the proper courts.
A further question which arises under the preference statutes
concerns the right of one, who is himself preferred, to step aside
and nominate another to act in his place. The statutes of some
states provide specifically for this procedure. Statutory provisions that the first class in the order of preference for appointment shall be the spouse, or a qualified person whom he or she
may request, have been construed as making the appointment of
a competent nominee of a surviving spouse mandatory, so that
the right of the nominee is superior to that of a member of a subsequent class. The Illinois statute on preference 27 lists six pre-

ferred classes of relatives "or any person nominated by them." It
would appear that under this statute the nominee of any of the
preferred classes would become a member of the nominator's
class, entitled to appointment ahead of a member of any less
preferred class. On the other hand, where the statutes provide
for preference but do not specifically provide for appointment of
a nominee, the results are not uniform. In West Virginia, for
example, the nominee is preferred on the ground that the statute
'ILL.

REV. STAT., Ch. 3, see. 248 (1953).
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does not prefer the distributee because of any peculiar fitness to
fill the office, but on account of his or her beneficial interest in
the estate to be administered.28 Although the North Carolina
statute has been amended to provide for the appointment of the
nominee,20 for many years previous to the amendment, when there
was no express provision for this procedure, the courts uniformly
held that the nominee was entitled to appointment.30 To the
contrary, however, is the case of Bivin v. MilIsap31 where the
Albama court held that the preferential right could not be delegated to a third person to the exclusion of a member of the class
next preferred. While the Tennessee statute has been construed
to permit the nomination of a stranger, 32 it has been held that
where a widow declined to act as administratrix and nominated
a bank to act and a daughter of the decedent protested the appointment of the nominee and sought to be appointed herself,
the daughter had the right to administer the estate. 3 The New
Mexico statute has been construed to mean that the preference
in the right to administer does not carry with it the right to
nominate a substitute where there is no specific statutory provision for nomination or delegation.34
In Kentucky the statutory authority for the appointment of
the nominee is inferred from the negative reference to such procedure found in the following language in KRS 395.015(2):
In case of intestacy, if there be no surviving spouse,
or if such spouse waives the right of appointment or is not
qualified to act and does not nominate a suitable administrator and there are more than one resident heir at law
entitled to appointment, the court shall thereupon appoint
a time for hearing such application. Notice of said hearing
shall be given to the surviving spouse and all known heirs
of the deceased residing in the state, in the manner provided in KRS 395.016. (1942, c. 167, sec. 5).
Under this statute, it has been held that only a person who is
himself qualified for appointment can nominate another to be
See Taylor v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 78 W. Va. 455, 88 S.E. 1070
(1916).
'N.C. GEN. STATS., sec. 28-6 (b).
' 0 In re Estate of Smith, 210 N.C. 622, 188 S.E. 2d 202 (1986).
31238 Ala. 186, 189, 220 (1939).
'In re Wooten's Estate, 114 Tenn. (6 Cates) 289, 85 S.W. 1105 (1908).
" Commerce Union Bank v. Fox, 28 Tenn. App. 587, 192 S.W. 2d 233 (1946).
Miller v. Murphy, 89 N.M. 40, 38 P. 2d 1116 (1934).
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administrator. In the case of Spayd's Adnr v. Brown 5 there
were no resident heirs, but one of two nonresident sisters nominated a resident in opposition to another resident who applied
for appointment. The court held that being disqualified herself,
the sister had no right to dictate to the comt who should act in
her place. On the other hand, of course, where the nominator
is the only person who is entitled to administer the estate, his
nominee must be appointed, if a suitable person. 0
The most serious question in connection with the right to
nominate arises when there are members of several preferred
classes available for appointment and one who himself has high
priority attempts to have his nominee appointed in preference to
a distributee of lesser preference. As has been shown, in some
states the nominee steps into the shoes of the nominator, and becomes entitled to appointment as against a distributee of secondary preference. This does not appear to have been the case in
Kentucky, at least until quite recently. In the case of Lalley v.
Lalley's Adnmr 3 7 the surviving distributees consisted of a sister
and three nieces, all of whom were qualified to administer. The
sister waived her right and on her motion the court appointed a
stranger to the estate. When the three nieces, prior to the second
county court, made a motion for the removal of the nominee of
the sister and for their own appointment, it was held that they
were entitled to be appointed. In the case of Treas v. Treas38 the
Court of Appeals seems to have departed from this rule. There
the decedent was survived by a widow and a nephew, both of
whom applied, the widow at the same time nominating a suitable
person to act in her stead. The court appointed the nominee of
the widow and was upheld on appeal where it was also held
that no notice or hearing was necessary when the surviving
spouse who was first preferred had nominated a suitable person.
The court said:
Mr. Treas left a widow. She was qualified, but
waived the right of appointment as administratrix. However, she did nominate a suitable person to administer the
31 Ky. Law Rep. 438, 102 S.W. 823 (1907). See also Ellwanger v.
Ellwanger's Adm'r, supra note 13.
' Louisville Trust Co. v. Bingham, 178 Ky. 578, 199 S.W. 58 (1917).
S256
Ky. 50, 75 S.W. 2d 544 (1934).
- 240 S.W. 2d 593 (Ky. 1951).
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estate. Therefore, no notice of a hearing was necessary.
The preference given the surviving husband or wife under
KYRS 395.040 includes the right of the survivor to nominate
a suitable administrator under the conditions set forth in
Paragraph 2 of KRS 395.015. 39
While this case does not specifically hold that the appointment
of the nominee of the person first preferred, who is qualified, to
the exclusion of another distributee is mandatory, that seems to
be its meaning. There would appear to be no sound objection to
such an interpretation. No one could successfully maintain that
an unsuitable nominee must be appointed under any circumstances. As has been pointed out, it has been held that the nominator must also be suitable and qualified. Since the preference
does not apply unless both the preferred spouse or distributee
and his or her nominee are qualified in all respects, it would
appear logical that when these conditions are met, the appointment of the nominee should be just as mandatory as would have
been the appointment of the nominator. After all, the area of
discretion in respect to qualifications is large, and the court has
made it abundantly clear that the preference statute of Kentucky
confers no absolute rights.40 Wherever the applicant or nominee
is, in the court's opinion, incapable of discharging the trust, that
person's right to be appointed vanishes.
No attempt has been made here to discuss all of the problems
which arise in the application of the statutory preference. However, the underlying problem created by these statutes is the matter of how far the discretion of the court is limited by them. The
cases herein discussed, when considered together, show that while
the preferences granted seem to make mandatory the appointment of a fully qualified member of a preferred class, or his
nominee, the county court is still the judge of the applicant's
qualifications. This being so, it cannot be said that the hands of
the court are unreasonably tied by these statutes.
Id. at 594.
Ky. 748, 212 S.W. 2d 272 (1948).
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